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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
CR13UNAL LAW - COURT-MARTIAL CONVIcTION - SECOND-
OFFENDER STATUTE. - D, having been previously convicted in a
court-martial proceeding for refusing to obey an order to carry
coal and sentenced to imprisonment in the Disciplinary Barracks,
was convicted of a felony' and was sentenced to confinement in the
penitentiary for a term of not less than one nor more than ten
years, at the expiration of which term his imprisonment to continue,
under the second-offender statuteO for an additional five-year term,
due to the previous conviction. Held, that a previous conviction of
fifteen years in a court-martial proceeding is not a like punishment
within the meaning of the statute. State v. Wleeler.3
Although the West Virginia statute existed without change
from the formation of the state until 1939,' this case is the first to
involve a previous court-martial conviction. With a large body of
men subjected to military law and punishment today, this case may
become of increasing importance. Only one similar case elsewhere
has been found. In the ease of People v. Wilsoni a conviction by
a court-martial for sodomy was held to be a "previous conviction"
within the meaning of the New York second-offender statute.0 This
1 Fraudulently obtaining a signature to a certificate of nomination. W. VA.
CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 3, art. 7, § 1.
"4"When any person is convicted of an offense, and sentenced to confinement
therefor in the penitentiary, and it is alleged in the, indictment on which the
person is convicted, and admitted, or by the jury found, that the person has
been before convicted in the United States of a crime punishable by imprison-
ment in a penitentiary, the court shall, if the sentence to be imposed is for a
definite term of years, add five years to the time for which the person is or
would be otherwise sentenced. Whenever in such case the court imposes an
indeterminate sentence, five years shall be added to the maximum term of
imprisonment otherwise provided for under such sentence." W. Va. Acts 1939,
c. 126, art. 11, § 18. This act changed the statute which had previously read
"that he had been before sentenced in the United States to a like punish-
ment, he shall be sentenced to be confined five years in addition to the time
which he is or would be otherwise sentenced." W. VA. CODE (Mi hie, 1937). c.
61, art. 11, § 18. This change emphasizes the meaning of the term "like
punishment" to mean previous conviction to confinement in the penitentiary.
The act changes the requirements from previous "sentence" to confinement
in the penitentiary to a previous "conviction" of a crime punishable by im-
prisonment in the penitentiary. The syllabus of the principal case is couched
in terms of the statute before the change, although the case arose after it hai
been changed.
3 14 S. E. (2d) 677 (W. Va. 1941).
4 See amendment in note 2, supra. The statute before change may be found
in its precise wording in VA. CODE (1849) c. 199, § 25; VA. CODE (1860) c. 199,
§ 25; W. VA. CODE (1868) c. 152, § 23; W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 152,
§ 23; W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 61, art. 11, § 18.
5257 App. Div. 555, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 749 (1939).
6 GILBER, Cma NAnL CODE iD PENAL LAw, Nnw YoRx (21st ed. 1938) §
1941.
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case may be distinguished, however, as the prior offense is a felony'
punishable both by military and civil law, while in the principal
case the prior offense is neither a felony nor is it punishable by
civil law.
The theory which underlies habitual criminal statutes is to
protect society by imposing more severe punishment for a second
offense which is deemed to be evidence of "the incorrigible and
dangerous character"" of the accused. It is submitted that D's
infraction of military rules was not such a previous crime as to
show a criminal tendency.
Further, could punishment for such an offense in the Dis-
ciplinary Barracks be a previous conviction within the meaning
of a statute which contemplates a previous offense punishable in
the penitentiary, especially when the statute being highly penal
is to be construed strictly in favor of the accused' The court-
martial,10 forming no part of the judicial system of the United
States but rather belonging to the executive branch of govern-
ment," has discretion to confine the prisoner "in any United States,
Territorial, or District penitentiary . . . or in the United States
Disciplinary Barracks' ,1 2 but the forty-second Article of War
prohibits punishment by confinement in the penitentiary unless
thte offense is recognized as an offense of a civil nature and is so
punishable by penitentiary confinement for more than one year by
some statute of the United States." Thus, there is a distinction
between punishment in the penitentiary and in the Disciplinary
Barracks.14
7 Sodomy is a felony in New York. Id. at § 690. Sodomy is a felony at
common law. 4 BL. Cor. 215.
8 1 BisHop, CRnnrmAL LAw (9th ed. 1923) § 993a. See also State v. Graham,
68 W. Va. 248, 69 S. E. 1010 (1910) ; State v. Stout, 116 W. Va. 398. 180 S. E.
443 (1935); and McCuaig, Modern Tendencies in Habitual Crfimnal Legis-
lation (1929) 15 Corn. L. Q. 62.
9 Hall v. Norfolk & Western R. R., 44 W. Va. 36, 28 S. E. 754 (1897);
Diddle v. Continental Casualty Co., 65 W. Va. 170, 63 S. E. 962 (1909).
10 The court-martial is "IA military court, convened under authority of the
government and articles of war, for trying and punishing military offenses com-
nitted by soldiers ... in the army. Such courts have jurisdiction by virtue of
military law, . . . empowered by authority from a commanding officer."
BLAcK, LAw DICToNARY (3d ed. 1933) 460.
- Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487, 6 S. Ct. 148, 29 L. Ed. 458 (1885);
Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 15 L. Ed. 838 (U. S. 1857); State v. Nuchols, 18
NT. D. 233, 119 N. W. 632 (1909); State v. Peake, 22 N. D. 457, 135 N. W.
197 (1912).
12 38 STAT. 1084, 10 U. S. C. A. § 1452 (1915).
3. 41 STAT. 795, 10 U. S. C. A. § 1513 (1920).
14 This distinction is emphasized by designation of the place of confinement
at Fort Leavenworth as the United States Disciplinary Barracks, and not the
penitentiary. 38 STAT. 1084, 10 U. S. C. A. § 1451 (1915).
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The court leaves open the question of whether the statute con-
templates only a previous conviction of a felony under the law of
West Virginia, or is all-embracing of felonies under any law. A
further question remains whether a sentence by court-martial to
the 'United States penitentiary instead of to confinement in the
Disciplinary Barracks would have met the requirements of our
statute, which only requires a previous conviction of a crime punish-
able in a penitentiary.
M. S. K.
DEDS - CONSTRUCTION AS TO GRANTEES - OFFICIAL oR REPRE-
SENTATIVE CAPACITY.- , as receiver of the X National Bank, sold
several tracts of land to B at a public sale. B later refused the con-
veyance on the ground that A had no title to the land sold. The
property had been purchased by A's predecessor in office at a sale
to enforce the bank's lien thereon, the conveyance having been made
to "C, Receiver of the X National Bank, an insolvent national bank-
ing association." B demurred to A's bill for specific performance.
Held, that such a deed conveys the land to the grantee in his in-
dividual capacity, and "Receiver of the X National Bank", etc., is
only descriptio personae. Hardesty v., Fairmont Supply Co.,
The court announced that it was merely following the rule laid
down in Dona7hue v. Rafferty and Hyman v. Swint,' two earlier
West Virginia cases. The former decision did not specifically con-
cern the construction of a deed, but of certain other papers; yet it
was held therein that the designation "Rt. Rev. P. J. Donahue,
Bishop of Wheeling" was not inconsistent with a fee in Donahue
personally. Hyinan v. Swint arose on a demurrer, the actual hold-
ing being that there was nothing in a conveyance to the "Rt. Rev.
P. J. Donahue, Bishop of Wheeling" which contradicted the aver-
ment in the bill that Donahue held title to the property in his in-
dividual capacity. However, the general statement was made that
"where property is conveyed to one whose name in the deed is fol-
lowed simply by his title or name in office, the legal title vests in
him individually."" This generalization may not have been war-
ranted by either the facts or the holding in that particular litiga-
tion.4
'14 S. E. (2d) 436 (W. Va. 1941).
2Donahue v. Rafferty, 82 W. Va. 535, 96 S. E. 935 (1918); Hyman v. Swint,
94 W. Va. 627, 119 S. E. 866 (1923).
3 94 W. Va. at 633.
4 In Rinehart v. Ireland, 120 W. Va. 599, 199 S. E. 871 (1938), the result
appears to be that a conveyance to " .A. Rinehart, Reciver of Y County
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